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The subjective impact of the jihadist offer*
Fethi Benslama
The jihadist radicalism can represent an important factor in relationship with the process
of subjectivation, identification, de-idealization and re-idealization of adolescents or
young adults today. This contribution focuses on the phenomenon of radicalization in
France and on its clinical aspects, on the basis of the data collected by the Ministry of
Internal Affairs in 2015. It aims to understand the sources of radicalisation, showing that
many of the candidates for jihad are getting younger and younger, belong to all social
classes and constitute a heterogeneous whole, including the element of “prolonged
adolescence” into a factorial multiplicity. In this perspective it is possible to measure the
function of ideals in juvenile temporality, to interpret the clinically corroborated data
according to it and to analyse the power of collecting negativity that characterizes jihadist
radicalism around the world at present.
Fethi Benslama is Professor of clinical psychopathology and dean of the department of
Psychoanalytical Studies at the Universit- Paris-Diderot.
The phenomenon of Islamist radicalisation has nowadays taken on epidemic di-
mensions, which are more or less substantial depending on the country, di-
mensions that need to become intelligible at the intersection of subjectivity,
politics and history. The junction of these three coordinates is necessary, because
no univocal point of view allows the summarisation of the facts. Here I would like
to propose an approach in which the parameter of subjectivity does not elude the
other two.
My remarks concern the issue of radicalisation in France, where I work on the
clinical and research level. I will start by recalling some data that was made public
by the Ministry of Internal Affairs; this data can be found in several reports
commissioned by the government, of which the most complete and interesting is
the one by deputy S-bastien Pietrasanta, published in June 2015.1
Until June 2015 there were 4462 individuals in France signalised as radicalised.
Saying “signalised individuals” means that this is the known part of an otherwise
larger reality. Here some notable characteristics of this population:
– 25 % are minors
– 35 % are women
* Translation: Natalie Eder.
1 Pietrasanta 2015.
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– 40 %have converted to Islam (the converts represent 50 %of those who travel
to the combat zones)
– 2/3 are aged between 15 and 25.
If we move from the aspect of radicalisation to that of engagement in war zones,
we notice the following:
– 700 young people have gone to these zones
– 475 are currently in Iraq and Syria
– 220 have come back to France
– 1800 individuals are said to be implicated in jihadist networks. These figures
make France the Western European country in which the most citizens con-
tribute to jihadism. Moreover it is estimated that the number of European
combatants of the 20.000 strangers currently present in Iraq and above all Syria
is about 5000.
Many of the candidates for jihad, who are getting younger and younger and
belong to all social classes, are unknown to the police forces.According to a survey
by the Centre de pr*vention des d*rives sectaires li*es % l!islam (CPDSI)2 of 160
families received by the centre:
– 60 % of the young people (belonging to those families and involved in jihad-
ism) belong to the middle class
– 30 % to the lower (and least affluent) class
– 10 % to the upper class.
Even if those numbers are not representative of the totality of the radicalised, they
show that radicalisation is not specific to the working class or the banlieue. We
have indeed been witnessing an extension of the phenomenon to the middle class
ever since the expansion of the civil war to the whole of Syria and the appearance
of Daesh, also called the “Islamic State”. Farhad Khosrokhavar distinguishes the
radicalised of the lower class and those of the middle class by reference to their
trajectory and the motives for their engagement.3
According to Pietrasanta!s report there are Atheists and youths without any
connection to immigration among this population. In addition, there is an in-
creasing proportion of departures that involve families and women, which is new
for jihadism: one goes to Syria to build a life and to start a family. The project of
the “Islamic State” attracts certain young people and not only those fromMuslim
families.
2 This survey focuses on 160 families received in theCentre de pr*vention des d*rives
sectaires li*es % l!islam (CPDSI, in English: Centre of prevention of sectarian mis-
demeanour linked to Islam): Bouzard / Caupenne / Valsan 2014.
3 Khosrokhavar 2015.
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This data shows us a diversity that produces great difficulties in establishing
profiles in general and particularly with regard to the “average” radicalised or
jihadist candidate. From a sociological point of view the examined group con-
stitutes a heterogeneous whole, which does not allow going beyond noticing re-
currences in the path and the process of radicalisation.
However, the most prominent element of this picture – that 2/3 are aged be-
tween 15 and 25 – seems to me to be a very important fact. It means that the
majority of the so-called “radicalised” comprises either adolescents or young
adults that find themselves in the moratory zone where the crossing of ado-
lescence may lead to its extension and a prolonged state of crisis. Little use has
beenmade of this fact in order to understand the sources of radicalisation. There is
no question of reducing the latter to a causality considered to be mechanically
linked to the troubles of adolescence – here as much as anywhere else it would be
an error to isolate one single causal element. The idea is rather to include the
element of “prolonged adolescence” into a factorial multiplicity which leads to a
condensation in the form of radicalisation, or of which radicalisation is the con-
densation.
This is when we need to keep in mind the anthropological fact of the extension
of adolescence, in particular since the second half of the twentieth century, which
is characterised by an increasingly shorter childhood and an increasingly delayed
maturity, both of which have become one of the marks of modern civilisation
beyond the sole occidental area. Somuch so that the notions of “preadolescence”
and “post-adolescence” have been suggested and that the services of the infantile
and juvenile psychiatric sector around theworld receive youths up to the age of 26
and sometimes even beyond. The extension of adolescence between “pre” and
“post” starting from puberty signifies that there is a juvenile temporality that is
adjustable to the individuals and the sociocultural environment.4
This observation leads me to interpret the afore-mentioned clinically corro-
borated data according to that juvenile temporality. The first angle of this inter-
pretation results from what all clinicians of adolescence and its extension know,
which is that this young population finds itself at the stage of life that centres on
ideality. In the background the reorganisation of identity takes place, a re-
organisation which can be tumultuous with variations that can go from normalcy
up to the pathological.
Inmyopinion the appropriate angle of approach is thus the one concernedwith
the issue of the ideals through which the individual and the collective, the sub-
jective and the political are intertwined in the development of the subject, at the
very moment where a transformation of identity takes place in juvenile tempo-
rality. Yet the ideals raising the edifice of the subject, rooting it in a community,
hinging it to the preceding generations and carrying it towards the desire to create
4 In the 1960s the psychiatrist Pierre M&le proposed the notion of “juvenile crisis”,
which corresponds to that extended adolescence. See M&le 1982.
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a better world, these ideals can also become the source of excess, terror and
ravages beyond mention. The twentieth century was a century of political cata-
strophes induced by the exaltation of ideals on the area of entire civilisations. In
this regard Europe has paid a very high human price.
Ideals hence contain potential and explosive radicalness of which the mani-
festations depend on the individual variations and the social and historic context.
The epidemic dimension of “Islamist radicalisation” is a configuration of recent
idealistic enthusiasm specific to theMuslim world and its crisis of civilisation, but
it has become global and has acquired the power to collect negativity within and
beyond this world. The power to collect negativity in the sense that this config-
uration shelters and nourishes frustration, hate, self-rejection and the rejection of
the world at its current stage, which all find an “ecological niche” (in the sense in
which Ian Hacking5 uses this expression) in the ideal of radical Islamism. This
notionmakes it possible to take into account the conditions that allow a social and
psychological epidemic to erupt (the “mad travellers” of the nineteenth century in
the work of Ian Hacking), to develop, to proliferate in a particular cultural and
historic space, and finally to get extinguished as would a species that does not find
adequate living conditions anymore.
One cannot understand the jihadist offer and its impact, if we donot analyse the
developmental conditions of the “ecological niche” of the Islamist ideal on a
demographic, economic, political and geopolitical level. Important papers have
been dedicated to this subject, like those by Olivier Roy.6 But the parameter of
individual and collective psychology is absent in the study of the conditions of the
“ecological niche” of the radical Islamist ideal. This is what I dedicatemywork to.
In order to measure the function of ideals in juvenile temporality the issue of
identity characteristic for this period has to be kept in mind.
What constitutes the crisis of this life period is the subjective transition in which
the ideals of childhood are smashed to pieces and the necessity to replace them
with new ideals imposes itself with an avidity that bears witness to the urgency of
the quest. The avidity of ideals: this critical moment is characterised by intense
movements of “dis-idealisation” and “re-idealisation”. In dis-idealisation the
subject collapses, falls into the “doldrums”,7 as Winnicott called it, which means
that it feels emptiness, boredom, depression, the absence ofmeaning in its life and
belittles itself. In re-idealisation it experiences exaltation, the impetus of ideas and
passions, the attempt of elevating its self-representation, the desire to set out for a
new world or to participate in its creation, the aspiration of finding a plenary
meaning through which truth and justice can triumph.
Whence does this necessity, urgency and avidity of ideals come? From the fact
that the subject has to appropriate itself, this self that is not that of the child that
5 Hacking 2002.
6 Roy 1992.
7 Winnicott 1965.
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developedwith the help of the parents, but a self supposed to become the subject!s
own. Henceforth it wants to “belong” to itself by reinventing itself. However this
appropriation forces it to undertake the reorganisation of the most crucial
boundaries of human existence: between the me and the non-me, life and death,
its sex and the other sex, reality and fiction, the world and the hereafter etc. This is
not a game with limits, or if it is one, it is a dangerous game where the borders risk
becoming blurred or partially vanishing. This is when the subject!s survival is at
stake. If it takes such risks that is because, through the peril it faces, it aspires to
conquer itself and to master its own existence. This explains the frequency of
transgressive experiences in which the borders of the self are stretched, and, to
some extent, adolescent suicide attempts. Acting out often includes the desire of
transformation, of leaving one!s skin in order to get a new one, like this young
womanwho declared: “I wanted to kill myself, but I did not want to die.”All in all,
there is a perilous passage described by the poet Rainer Maria Rilke in the verse
“Whatwas is not anymore and not yet what will be”.He designates thus a caesura,
an interval, the passage from one shore to the other that has to be overcome in the
hope for a new self and a new world.
This crossing gives rise to the critique of the world of appearances on which
childhood is largely based, to the doubting of the ideas of the adults, whose beliefs
are perceived as illusions or conspiracies against truth and justice by the youth
who consequently wishes to dismantle them. One might call this a juvenile rev-
olution.However, inmany cases this reorganisation of the boundaries and thewill
to master oneself lead to extreme and dangerous experiments. They border on
ordeal-like behaviour where the youth exposes himself to experiences of which
the outcome will serve as judgment on his dignity or indignity, his value or in-
significance, his ability or impotence. It is about surviving these trials that can take
on diverse forms. This is where “radicalisation”, regardless of its ideological
content, can present itself as some kind of probation and the solution for over-
coming the hiatus indicated by Rilke!s verse.
“What was is not anymore and not yet what will be”, it is in this in-between, in
this passage from one shore to the other and its deviations that the point of the
impact of the jihadist offer is located. Its discourse and the recruitment procedures
make use of many of themotives of the subjective juvenile transition, like a hunter
who sets up the traps knowing his prey!s path.
These young people at whom the offer is aimed are expecting a transition; they
are on the look-out for a solution or in the middle of the ford. Particularly on the
look-out are those for whom the adolescent passage is difficult because of per-
sonal flaws that result from mishaps in their life and/or failures in their family or
social environment. They do not necessarily show obvious troubles. In some cases
they experience secret or hidden turmoil thatwewill call asymptotic and those are
the most unpredictable ones, sometimes the most dangerous. This will manifest
itself after some violent acting out through other people!s statements such as: “He
was a very kind boy, he was helpful, he helped the old lady from the fifth floor
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carry her shopping bags, etc.” In other cases, one notices chaotic journeys after-
wards, that had alreadymanifested themselves through delinquency or addiction;
some of them reveal borderline or psychotic troubles.
The offer of radicalisation creates a demand in the subject!s state of identity-
related fragility, which the offer transforms into powerful armour. When the
conjunction of supply and demand takes place, the flaws are compensated, buried.
For the subject this results in the sedation of its anguish, a feeling of liberation,
rushes of omnipotence. It becomes someone else, chooses another name. It adopts
the same behaviour as the members of its group. If the discourse of all radicalised
people seems as if it was held by the same person, this is due to the abdication of a
large part of their singularity: the subject yields to the fanatical automaton. The
sacrifice of its singularity indeed frees it from its symptoms to the exact extent that
psychological symptoms are correlative of the individual!s idiosyncrasy. The
symptoms, which are accounts of intimate conflicts, are converted into collective
formations. The elimination of all singularity and the absorption of the symptoms
in radicalisation are at the origin of the errors of assessment of many (clinically
un-trained) observers on supposedly “psychologically problem-free” radicalised
people, even though their subjective trajectory has been tumultuous, sometimes
even so risky that radicalisation is an attempt at surviving a state of interior
urgency.
This being said one should not confound explaining and excusing. The analysis
of the subjacent subjective reality of this phenomenon signifies neither insanity
nor irresponsibility, with the exception of certain cases.
This approach also allows us to understand the success of radical Islamism
among converts. Identity flaws are not the prerogative of the children of migrants
of Muslim families, which explains that 40 % of the radicalised are converts. I
would say that these subjects try to radicalise themselves before being introduced
to the product of radicalisation. It does notmatter whether they know of what this
product is made, as long as it brings them “the solution”. The press has reported
the case of jihadists who had ordered books like “Islam for Dummies” on the
internet. One needs an important dose of ignorance in order for one!s fantasies to
wrap themselves in innocence and to look for their realisation without fear nor
doubt. The examiningmagistrateMarc Tr-vidic of the antiterrorist centre in Paris
has declared on several occasions that certain returnees from the combat zones
whom he interrogated did not know the five pillars of Islam!
Some of the volunteers in the combat zones do not primarily look for the
spiritual dimension or a religious conversion. They want to rebel against the
injustice suffered by the Syrians through the regime of Bashar al-Assad. For
others the departure towards the mysterious war-torn East serves as a romantic
and initiatory passage. It struckme to read texts on the history of the crusades and
to notice numerous similarities to “the subjective venture” of these departures to
Jihad. Could jihadism be an inverted crusade: a “crescentade”?
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Today, radical Islamism is themost widespread product on the internetmarket,
the most exciting, the most unabridged. It is the master key to idealisation readily
available to those having lost hope with regards to themselves and the world.
The assimilation of Islamist radicalisation to a sectarian phenomenon is largely
erroneous. There are some comparable aspects, like the phenomenon of “mental
control”, but essential differences are apparent. In a sect the individual submits to
his fantasies or the delirious theories of the guru, to his economic or even sexual
exploitation. As to the jihadist, he adheres to a very large collective belief, the
belief in the identitymyth of Islamism,which is nourished by the reality ofwar and
in which he is offered to take a heroic part by means of material and sexual
advantages, real and imaginary powers. Themixture ofmyth and historic reality is
more toxic than being in delirium would be.
The radical offer will thus seize the impasses of the juvenile passage andmodel
itself on the possibilities of a crossing that is at the same time individual and
collective, physical and metaphysical, mythical and historical, of which I wish to
show the main motives.
1. Identity-related justice is the cornerstone of the radical and jihadist offer. It
touches on the heart of the identity flaws of young people. It is based upon the
theory of “the wounded Islamic ideal” and the wrong having been done to
Muslims in the past and the present. This wounded ideal is linked to the loss of the
principle of theological and political sovereignty of the Muslim community with
the abolition of the Caliphate and the dismemberment of the last Muslim empire,
the Ottoman Empire, in 1924 by the colonial powers. It should be noted that the
organisation of the Muslim Brothers was founded in 1928. One could say that
Islamist movements were born of the trauma of this period and have propagated
this shock to the masses. As for the wrong done to the Muslims: the ancient and
recent wars in the Middle East; Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. Pictures of
destruction, massacre and dead and mutilated children serve as support, along
with the appeal to become a righter of wrongs. One observes that there are young
people who are not Muslims who respond to this call for justice. But for the
majority the jihadist offer consists of placing the wrong done to the Muslim
community on top of an already previously experienced individual prejudice. It
aims at having the subject absorbed by the wounded ideal and the injury and to
speak and act through it like a revenant. It is called to become the avenger of the
ideal or, what amounts to the same thing, the avenger of the offended deity. The
case of the Kouachi brothers in the attack against Charlie Hebdo is paradigmatic
in this regard. There are young people whom the deficiency of the ego ideal (id*al
dumoi) leads to look for an incarnation of the collective ideal, which is at its fullest
in the act of becoming a martyr.
2. Dignification and access to omnipotence: To young people who lack self-
esteem,whohave the feeling of being stifled, of having no value and “being trash”,
as one of them told me, one offers the recognition not only of their having been
harmed, but also of being one ofGod!s elect, underestimated by everyone. To take
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on this chosen destiny, the youth has to inspire respect and fear, become a mis-
sionary of the cause, a hero to whom the gates of glory will open. He can take the
law into his own hands, he is authorized to be outside of it in the name of God!s
superior law. “The trash” thus becomes fearsome. Fearsomeand feared byhis own
family. A father toldme: “My son has becomemy father, he dictates themorals of
Islam to me… Even more, he takes himself for the father of God, after having
been involved with drugs and delinquency.”
3. Repentance and purification: Islamist radicalism is a religious ideology of
which one of the fundamentals is repentance and purification. It deals with the
culpability of living and desiring that one finds among young people who some-
times have not committed a single crime. The torment indeed intensifies where
there is misfortune and shame of existing. Particularly with identity troubles: The
subject tells itself that it has no value, that it is a “defect”, according to thewords of
a patient. But the offer also reaches delinquents looking for forgiveness (there are
delinquents who are such due to a feeling of culpability, as Freud pointed out) or
delinquents who find a means of ennobling their criminal urges through their
enrolment in jihadism. The offer of radicalisation reflects unto us this message:
You are unworthy because you are godless and lawless, you have the possibility to
expiate and to ask for forgiveness: become a “Supermuslim”!
I call Supermuslim the position in which a Muslim is brought to outbid the
Muslim that he is through the representation of aMuslim that has to be evenmore
Muslim. This is the behaviour of a subject that is prey to its own reproaches of
defection and the harassment by the armyofmedia preachers who accuse it all day
long of the worst moral crimes and doom it to be “a combustible in hell”. It is
called to “over-identify” with the exemplary Muslim, the prophet and the perfect
ancestor by establishing a border against the impure by joining the group of the
pure, even at the cost of challenging its own parents and family, whom it will save
during the Last Judgment.
4. The restoration of the subject of community versus the subject of society:
The restoration of the subject of community is associated with the promise of the
return to the world of tradition, where being a subject is given, ensured, guar-
anteed. By contrast the subject of modern civilisation, of social contract, the
individual as such is the blockbuster of itself and in order for it to be that, it is
forced to accomplish exhausting work. One needs the means for that. One ex-
ample of the guarantee given to the subject of community: When one offers a
youth of 16 years old to choose another name for himself that starts with “Abou
X” (Abou Ali, Abou Salah), which means “Father of…”, then, even though he is
not a father in reality, by renaming himself he jumps from the condition of being a
son to the condition of “being a father”, becoming thus the origin of an imaginary
posterity. He hence becomes his own origin. Today there are young people who
prefer the reassuring order of a communitywith restrictive norms, allocating them
to an authoritarian structure that relieves themof the disarray of freedom and of a
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personal responsibility for which they do not have the resources, meaning the
psychological and material resources.
5. The elimination of the boundary between life and death: The preachers!
discourse penetrates the unconscious fantasies of the adolescents at the moment
where they go through the process of reorganising the infantile theories of the
boundaries between life and death. They saturate themwith litanies on imminent
or already present death, on the throes of the grave (a terrifying type of sermon),
throes that they have to spare themselves from now on as if they were already
dead. Imaginary death is so invasive that real death becomes insignificant, which
explains that some young recruits declare: “Death is nothing, it!s like a pinch.” A
pinch that transports them to the paradisiac other world. In the case of the man
killed in battle, the martyr, he is only apparently dead; he stays alive, enjoying all
his possessions, being thus an immortal. The subject hence has to die in order to
get access to this immortal life. The recurrence of the desire to die and even the
desire of already being dead is a constant fact in the discourse of the jihadist offer.
Because when somebody already feels dead nothing can happen to him anymore,
apart from living in the current world, which is considered as being vile. In his
excellent book of testimony Les FranÅais jihadistes,8 David Thomson reports the
words of a youth that told him: “Allah decrees our death even before our birth.”
This affirmation does not exist in the traditional corpus of Islam. This wouldmean
that what we call “the primitive scene” in psychoanalysis, the scene of the fan-
tasies on the origins of life, is a scene of annihilation and thus the source of a
melancholy feeling of self-loss and of matrix fusion with the forces of life and
death alike.
The jihadist offer corresponds therefore to a policy oriented towards the tri-
umph over death: what one could call a thanatopolicy.9 But the type of death in
question contains some superior form of life. In our eyes death is opposed to
narcissism, but here death is at the service of narcissism. Death is a mother that
gives birth to the candidate for a perfect life. The candidate gives up his life, which
is the life of a good-for-nothing and therefore has no value, to the totally Other
and expects that the latter will make it perfect for him.Aperfect life is a life where
the ideal prevails over the egowhich is liberated from everything in theworld. It is
verywell possible that here some subjects find the possibility of converting suicide
into self-sacrifice, but self-sacrifice in jihadism involves what Lacan called the
“supreme narcissism of the lost Cause”.10 This is the experience we make of the
incomparable dignity that every man who has lost his life acquires in our eyes.
Somebody!s death constitutes the most powerful and ultimate assertion of the
value of his existence.
8 Thomson 2014.
9 In the original: thanatopolitique [translator!s note].
10 In the original “narcissisme suprÞme de la Cause perdue”, in Lacan 1966, p. 826.
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6. A theory of evil and regeneration:One of the fears of adolescence is related
to the access to the adult world and its logic, particularly to the game of social
pretending that the youth loathes for its dishonesty. Yet the jihadist offer tries to
persuade the youth that the world in which he lives is corrupted, unjust, wrapped
into falsehood: a vile world.11Thus the centrality of conspiracy theories, which are
supposed to unveil hidden duplicity and malfeasance. From this the appeal to
become the chastener of hypocrites (especially false Muslims or what one might
call “Islamoids”) and an operator of the regeneration of the Muslim world is
deduced. I will be succinct about this, because one finds the motive of the eradi-
cation and regeneration of the world in many totalitarian ideologies, for example
in the Nazi or the Khmer rouge ideology.
7. The completion ofmeaning and theLast Judgment:The juvenile transition is
a period of meaning-related deadlock, existential absurdity and shaped by in-
vasive waves of emotions that are difficult to link and organise. The senselessness
destabilises identity bearings and provokes fears of estrangement and endless
decomposition. The transition places the subject in a state of expectation, where it
waits for themomentwhen it will finally take on solid shape and the incessant flow
of ideas will end. Yet the extremist Islamist discourse is a supplier of signs from all
quarters which announces the end of time and the total closure of meaning
throughmillenarian and apocalyptic themes. Currently, this discourse situates the
end of the world in Syria, by using a prophecy as an excuse, a prophecy which is
often repeated by young people who claim to want to go to Syria in order to
participate in the end of the world, after the reestablishment of the Caliphate of
which the “Islamic State” is the realisation. The apocalypse is the disclosure of
meaning and its achievement, the final triumph, melancholy, certainly, but not
void of the premature pleasure of the definitive victory of Islam. The apocalypse is
a total purification that proceeds in the formof the disappearance of theworld and
the coming of the reign of the other world.
The enumeration that I have undertaken is not exhaustive, one could elaborate
on the motives, but the power of the Islamist offer resides in its system that
promises young people in crisis an exhilarating crossing at the very moment their
existence has got entangled in negativity, distress and absurdity.
11 “Un monde immonde” in the French original. The author makes use of the paro-
nomasia of the terms “world” and “vile”, which already existed in Latin (“mundus” and
“immundus”) and is particularly striking since “immonde/immundus” has the appear-
ance of being the negation of “monde/mundus” [translator!s note].
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